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SOME DILEMMAS OF AN 
INTERNATIONALIST IN A WORLD OF STATE 
EGOISM 
L.F.E. Goldie* 
The opening words of Bacon's essay Of Truth are: "What is truth? 
said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer." 
The validity of any statement about international law turns on the 
meaning one is prepared to give the term. To say that the obligation to 
pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation for the expropriation 
of alien property derives from the body of traditional customary interna-
tional law pertaining to the responsibility of states, or that the obliga-
tion derives from domestic (constitutional), and not international law 
at all, is to speak without clear referent. Clarity of both intent and 
ideology are absolute necessities. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL CUSTOMARY DOCTRINE 
In the Factory at Chorzow' case the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, the inter-war predecessor of the present International 
Court of Justice, concluded that international law required states which 
expropriated property to pay compensation, not only for the assets 
taken, but also for the owner's loss of profits-but not, presumably, for 
speculative profits, sed quaere. 2 In that case the Court laid down in 
detail the principles of compensation. It called for: 
Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum 
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the 
award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be 
covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it .... 3 
The Court's thesis in the above case was reinforced, in a number of 
ways, by its decisions in both the Paneuezys-Saldutiskis Railway4 and 
the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits) 5 cases. 
*Professor of Law, Director, International Legal Studies Program, College of Law, 
Syracuse University. 
1. [19281 P.C.l.J., ser. A, No. 13. 
2. On the point of the Permanent Court of International Justice's measure of dam-
ages holding in the Factory at Chorzow decision and speculative damages, see H. LAUTER-
PACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 315-16 
(1958). 
3. [19281 P.C.I .J., ser. A, No. 13, at 47. 
4. [19391 P.C.l.J., ser. A/B, No. 76. 
5. [19261 P.C.l.J., ser. A, No. 7. 
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II. PROBLEMS OF RELEVANCE-CONTEMPORARY CON-
FRONTATIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS 
All these cases, however, were decided in the period between World 
War I and World War II. Many contemporary commentators argue that 
we cannot accept the authority of decisions from that period since it 
belongs to an age that is culturally and politically antediluvian. But 
does disagreement with the past necessarily abolish its contemporary 
relevance? The relevance and meaning of many inter-war concepts of 
international law are in a state of flux. But such a factual observation, 
while reporting negatively, perhaps, on rights which may have been cast 
into that observed flux, cannot, of itself, validate new rights, in particu-
lar validate or justify the expropriation of alien property without impos-
ing any corresponding or complementary duty to pay prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation to the owner of the confiscated investments. 
Even after we have said, with Justice Harlan in Banco Nacional de 
Cuba u. Sabbatino, 6 that: 
There are few if any issues in international law today on which 
opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to 
expropriate the property of aliens. There is, of course, authority, in 
international judicial and arbitral decisions, in the expressions of na-
tional governments, and among commentators for the view that a tak-
ing is improper under international law if it is not for a public purpose, 
is discriminatory, or is without provision for prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation .... 
The disagreement as to relevant international law standards re-
flects an even more basic divergence between the national interests of 
capital importing and capital exporting nations and between the social 
ideologies of those countries that favor state control of a considerable 
portion of the means of production and those that adhere to a free 
enterprise system.7 
We can still disagree with his conclusion. The jump from alleging 
or reporting the fact of the dissolution of old rights to asserting new and 
contrary rights is not justified of itself. For the new rights to be estab-
lished, their new underpinnings must be demonstrated. Merely to report 
the dissolution (even if, in fact, it has taken place) is not enough to 
establish the new. There are many possible options. 
Secondly, disagreement with Justice Harlan's statement of the con-
sequences of the play of international legal ideologies can most effec-
tively be reinforced by pointing up the weakness of his assumption that 
the lack of agreement he notes is singularly the quality of states' interna-
tional legal obligations respecting the expropriation of alien property. 
6. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
7. Id. at 428-30 (footnotes omitted). 
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This is far from being a unique case. In fact, it is sadly reflective of many 
areas of international law, none of which is more significant than the law 
of the sea. 
These contemporary trends are also reflected in the resolutions of 
the United Nations General Assembly on permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources. Accordingly, a brief adumbration of the trends re-
flected in these resolutions and an appraisal of their significance as 
illustrating both legal and political trends can provide us with insights 
as to beliefs in the state of governing international or municipal law, the 
possible directions of future legal change, the dilemmas facing capital 
exporting countries and the prerogatives upon which many capital im-
porting countries are coming to insist. 
III. THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
RESOLUTIONS ON PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
A. A Brief History 
The benchmark of contemporary declarations on states' rights to 
appropriate foreign-owned property is the United Nations General As-
sembly's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Re-
sources. 8 This resolution, after asserting the right of states to nationalize 
foreign-owned assets, required that such conduct should be for "reasons 
of public utility, security or national interest which are recognized as 
overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and for-
eign. "9 The same paragraph then provided that: 
In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation in 
accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures 
in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international 
law. 10 
The Declaration does not spell out what the rules of international 
law are. It may be argued that such silence leaves the definition of the 
requisite standards to the states concerned. Such an argument, how-
ever, is a denial of any meaningful connotation of the phrase "and in 
8. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962). For a 
contemporary account of this Resolution and the U.N. General Assembly, see Gess, 
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 398 (1964). Thus, 
para. 5 asserts: 
The free and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of peoples and nations over 
their natural resources must be furthered by the mutual respect of States based 
on their sovereign equality. 
See also G.A. Res. 1803, supra para. 7. 
9. G.A. Res. 1803, para. 4, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962). 
10. Id. See also id., para. 8. 
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accordance with international law" which is independent of the domes-
tic law standards also invoked in paragraph 4; namely, the requirement 
that "appropriate compensation" shall be "in accordance with the rules 
in force in the state" exercising its power to seize property. 
Secondly, the debate, today, is not so much as to what international 
law requires, as to whether international law or domestic law standards 
should govern the compensation to be paid to expropriated owners. 
Contemporary trends, accordingly, would not so much appear to be 
disturbing the content of international law as to attacking its relevance. 
There would thus appear to be general agreement that the international 
standards remain those laid down by the Permanent Court in the 
Factory at Chorzow case and reflected in the Norwegian Shipping 
Claims arbitration between the United States and Norway where the 
tribunal said: 
Whether the action of the United States was lawful or not, just 
compensation is due to the claimants under the municipal law of the 
United States, as well as under international law, based upon the re-
spect for private property.1 1 
The debate over whether domestic or international law standards 
should be applied has continued. And, in recent years the former posi-
tion has won increasing adherence in the United Nations General As-
sembly. Thus, while the 1962 Declaration explicitly invoked, as has been 
pointed out, standards of "international law" as governing the payment 
of compensation to the victims of expropriation, the most recent state-
ment from that body reverses the previous position. In December 1973 
the General Assembly adopted a further Resolution on Permanent Sov-
ereignty Over Natural Resources12 which provided, in operative para-
graph 3, that the General Assembly: 
Affirms that the application of the principle of nationalization 
carried out by States, as an expression of their sovereignty in order to 
safeguard their natural resources, implies that each State is entitled to 
determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of pay-
ment, and that any disputes which might arise should be settled in 
accordance with the national legislation of each State carrying out such 
measures. 13 
Only the United Kingdom voted against this Resolution (although 
the United States voted against paragraph 3 in a separate vote) while 
11. SCOTT, HAGUE COURT REPORTS, SECOND SERIES 39, at 69 (1932). Although the 
United States accompanied its payment of the compensation moneys to Norway with a 
protest against this award, it did not disagree with the principle that prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation should be paid for private property taken by governments. 
12. G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). 
13. Id., para. 3. 
5
Goldie: Some Dilemmas of an Internationalist in a World of State Egoism
Published by SURFACE, 1974
1974] Internationalist's Dilemmas 303 
sixteen states abstained. The question must be answered asking whether 
the trend of General Assembly Resolutions from 1962 to 1973 reflect and 
·announce a change in international law, and, themselves, provide the 
authority and evidence of that change. 
B. Appraisal of the Authority in Public International Law of the Per-
manent Sovereignty Resolutions 
Dr. Rosalyn Higgins 14 and Professors Falk15 and Onuf1 6 have pi-
oneered the study of the law-creating functions of the political organs 
of the United Nations. Dr. Higgins has seen their competence as stem-
ming from their capacity to impose obligations. Professor Falk, on the 
other hand, argues that the General Assembly, through consensus, pro-
duces norms that operate functionally as legal rules, even though they 
are not binding in a formal sense. 17 However, Professor Falk's thesis has 
not gone unchallenged, even among those who, in principle, welcome the 
recognition of new sources of international law. For example, Professor 
Onuf has written: 
Obviously, Falk's advocacy is incompatible with his claim to a middle 
position in dealing with the question of the legal significance of General 
14. See, e.g., R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE 
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS passim (1963); Higgins, The Development of 
International Law by the Political Organs of the United Nations, 59 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L 
L. 116 (1965). 
15. Falk, On the Quasi-Le{?islative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 782 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Falk, Quasi-Legislative Competence]. 
16. See Onuf, Professor Falk on the Quasi-Le{?islative Competence of the General 
Assembly, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 349 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Onuf]. 
17. Falk, Quasi-Legislative Competence, supra note 15, at 785. He writes: 
[Tlhere is discernible a trend from consent to consensus as the basis of 
international legal obligations . This trend reflects an adjustment to the altered 
condition of international society, especially the growing perception of social 
and economic interdependence, the increased number of states participating in 
international affairs, the. growth of international institutions as focal points for 
the implementation of the will of the international community and the dimin-
ishing willingness to insulate internationally important activity from interna-
tional legal control by deference to the dogma of domestic jurisdiction . . . . If 
international society is to function effectively, it requires a limited legislative 
authority, at minimum, to translate an overriding consensus among states into 
rules of order and norms of obligation despite the opposition of one or more 
sovereign states. 
Clearly, limits upon such a potentially wide and subjective set of criteria are called for. 
These, Falk indicates as follows: 
fT]he limits upon quasi-legislative competence of the Assembly are less a 
reflection of the absence of the formal competence to legislate than they are a 
consequence of certain political constraints arising from the general requirement 
of mobilizing effective community power in support of legislative claims. 
Id. at 788. 
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Assembly resolutions. His position is in fact a combination of analysis 
with a conservative thrust-General Assembly resolutions can be dealt 
with in the traditional terms of customary law formation-and advo-
cacy with a radical thrust. The outcome is unsettling, for one feels that 
Falk really cannot have it both ways. 
In support of this position Onuf argues that: 
[l]f Falk were to follow through explicitly on his position that General 
Assembly resolutions should be a sui generis source of international 
law, then his analysis of the present status of these resolutions in terms 
of their functional operation as law undermines the assumption behind 
his advocacy that the process of customary law formation is inadequate 
to the needs of an interdependent international community possessing 
a coherent will of its own. 18 
Some of the writers who, like Professor Falk, support the thesis that 
the General Assembly enjoys a law-indicating quasi-competence, ap-
pear to be generalizing from a limited number of specific instances such 
as the prohibition of stationing weapons of mass destruction in outer 
space, 19 anticolonialism, 20 and developments in the law of the sea. 21 The 
submission here, on the contrary, is that it is premature to attempt to 
discover constitutional law creating competences in the General Assem-
bly which are capable of formulation as rules of general validity rather 
like those which Professor Onuf sees as Professor Falk's thesis. Rather, 
at the present stage, specific topics in which there has been a general 
agreement among states, within international agencies, and among pub-
licists, should be examined. The object should be to determine whether 
the doctrine or rule has become part of international legal life through 
its juristic clarification by scholars, through the political consciousness 
of states in that it conforms with their international goals (and with 
overriding community goals), and through its institutional viability 
from the point of view of international agencies. In this connection, 
scholarship may be more fruitfully employed in the discernment and 
articulation of emerging rules in the contexts of significant international 
interactions than in a search for standards of formal validity. Although, 
in the long run, the means of identifying emerging rules as law may 
increasingly depend upon consensus in the political organs of the United 
Nations as, more and more, legal issues are thrashed out in their com-
mittees, assemblies and conferences, and in the organizations they pro-
liferate, the function of legitimation which they may come to perform 
needs to go beyond formal ideas of legal validity. The content of a norm 
is already becoming of primary importance for the purpose of its accept-
ance as a rule, just as the content of some customary rules has been the 
18. Onuf, supra note 16, at 352-53. 
19. See G.A. Res. 1884, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963). 
20. See G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). 
21. See, e.g., Falk, Quasi-Legislative Competence, supra note 15, at 790-91. 
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occasion of their decline and of the contemporary skepticism regarding 
the traditional processes for developing customary international law. 
In the specific context of the various General Assembly Resolutions 
on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources there is a basic point 
which can be gleaned from the various authors cited in the foregoing 
discussion, and is borne out by that discussion itself. General Assembly 
resolutions may emphasize continuing consensus for existing custom-
ary norms and may hasten the crystallization of rules which are emerg-
ing in the practice of states and of international agencies and organiza-
tions and which are coming to be noted in the writings of commentators. 
The 1962 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Re-
sources illustrates this. On the other hand, General Assembly resolu-
tions do not have the power to amend the law or to legislate legal change. 
In this sense then, paragraph 3 of the 1973 Resolution is powerless to 
change the legal validity of paragraph 4 of the 1962 Declaration. While 
both resolutions may appear to enjoy the same formal status as expres-
sions of the opinions of the General Assembly's membership, they differ 
fundamentally in their legal operations. The earlier document testifies 
to and reinforces positive international law while the latter is merely an 
attempt to obfuscate that testimony. 
IV. THE U.S. DILEMMAS AND THE U.S. STAKE IN AN 
UNPREDICTABLE WORLD 
Having argued that the present thrust of the Resolutions on Perma-
nent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources is, despite paragraph 3 of the 
1973 Resolution, to reinforce the traditional international law which 
allows states to expropriate foreign-owned assets, but requires the pay-
ment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, it is necessary 
to turn from legal dogmatics to the real world of effective politics. There 
we find the traditional and still valid custom more honored in the breach 
than the observance. 
As the contemporary trends in the international law of the sea 
illustrate, when international agreement on the binding effect of specific 
rules of law breaks down, each nation promotes its own version of the 
applicable rules of international law on the relevant points. The prove-
nance of such versions is inevitably based on the self-interests of each 
of the states involved and so is diametrically opposed to premises and 
sources of the rules of general international law based on consensus. 
Because they are oriented from the standpoint of the specific national 
interests of the states advancing them and are not, or are only acciden-
tally, intended to conform to world community interests, they necessar-
ily reflect a retrogressive and degenerative trend towards an order whose 
highest values reflect (as Mussolino phrased it) the "sacred egoism" of 
states. 
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If the breakdown in consensus has led to the kind of change in 
international law which Justice Harlan envisioned in the Sabbatino 
case, and which would appear to be reflected around this table, it must 
be pointed out that the argument which asserts that now an expropria-
tion without prompt, adequate and effective compensation is not in 
breach of international law still requires its independent justification 
and underpinning. The very premise of those who argue that the inter-
national law on the subject no longer applies is not that the established 
body of law has been replaced by a new one permitting such expropria-
tions whose compensation is solely determined by the expropriating 
state's domestic rules on the subject, but only that there is an insuffi-
cient consensus to underpin the older rules and render them continu-
ingly meaningful in the modern world. 
In such a situation there is no new rule of international law. All that 
has happened is that an ideological atmosphere has arisen in which each 
state considers itself to be entitled to formulate, as many have done with 
respect to the breadth of the territorial sea, its own domestic rules sup-
planting the former international ones. Today, acting on the basis of this 
scenario, states have declared that their own views of their rights to 
exercise competences in, or to appropriate areas of, the maritime com-
mon provide the exclusive standards for their own international con-
duct. In such a situation the United States, no less than Mexico, Chile, 
or Peru, for example, is entitled to formulate its own laws of maritime 
jurisdiction and of international investment. In the latter context it 
might be prudentially advisable for this country to formulate its laws 
and policies so as to protect its own economy from the costs and burdens 
of foreign expropriations. The object would be to maximize this coun-
try's own immediate benefits when its neighbors do the same. To think 
in terms of more long-term or indirect benefits could well render the 
American economy unacceptably vulnerable to destructive conduct by 
other nations who are motivated to hunt for their most immediate and 
obvious advantages. Hence paying the cost now for long-term, contin-
gent, advantages might involve a prudentially inadvisable gamble. 
The problem we in the United States are now facing is whether our 
policy with respect to foreign expropriations should be oriented from the 
standpoint of public international law and world welfare or from that 
of individual state welfare. Expropriating states are, clearly, merely 
consulting their own perceptions of their immediate individual national 
welfare. They are not concerned with the problems their policies create 
for capital exporting countries. Nor do they concern themselves with the 
impact their expropriations may have on third countries-including 
other developing, capital importing countries. These latter may see 
other states' expropriations abridge their developmental possibilities. 
Hence a general economic retrenchment of economic possibilities could 
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result through a contraction of available developmental capital. Such a 
contraction would be the inevitable result of the creation of an unfavora-
ble investment atmosphere through investors' apprehension that to in-
vest abroad is to invite the eventual confiscation of that investment. 
Such a curtailment could, secondly, also result from the non-availability 
of a yield from expropriated foreign investments in say, Nusquamia, 
that might otherwise be available to assist the development of Utopia. 
There are two different assumptions regarding our own ability to 
produce risk capital upon which we could operate. First, we might as-
sume that the supply is inexhaustible and that our economy will not be 
affected if the U.S. policy were to accept worldwide expropriations of 
American business. Second, we could assume that such wealth is not 
inexhaustible and that, therefore, it is necessary to develop protective 
policies to prevent a deleterious diminution of necessary risk capital and 
foreign exchange-earning income. It is clear from the bills in the House 
of Representatives22 and the Senate23 which are asserting a U.S. fishery 
limit of 200 sea miles that the Congress is seriously considering reversing 
traditional policies and values in order to take up what appears to a 
number of Congressmen to be a sensible, if unilaterally announced, 
economically self-protective posture with respect to ocean resources on 
the sensible assumption that these are not inexhaustible. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is with great personal distress that I see the analogy to which I 
have been pointing, in these brief remarks, between international in-
vestment law and the international law of the sea. In both we tend to 
see a breakdown of the rule of law through too much ill-will, vanity, 
chauvinism, selfishness and obsessiveness. It is necessary that this emo-
tional climate should change for a calmer and more reasonable one 
conditioning the transnational interactions of states. Ideally, what is 
needed is a consensus on basic principles of distributive justice accord-
ing to what each considers to be his due. But less would be enough; 
provided that the world's commerce could depend on a greater stability 
of expectations and a greater security of transactions, and business 
could make a more reasoned appraisal of its expectations. 
I am, regretfully, strongly reminded of the opening sentences of 
Susan Sontag's essay on Camus' Notebooks. She wrote: 
Great writers are either husbands or lovers. Some writers supply 
22. H.R. 8665, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Bill to extend on an Interim Basis the 
Jurisdiction of the United States over Certain Ocean Areas and Fisheries in Order to 
Protect the Domestic Fishing Industry, and for Other Purposes) . 
23. S. 1988, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Interim Fisheries Zone Extension and Man-
agement Bill) . 
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the solid virtues of a husband: reliability, intelligibility, generosity, 
decency. There are other writers in whom one prizes the gifts of a lover 
. .. moodiness, selfishness, unreliability, brutality . 
She added, later in the same piece: 
Today the house of fiction is full of mad lovers, gleeful rapists, 
castrated sons - but very few husbands. The husbands have a bad 
conscience, they would all like to be lovers. Even so husbandly and 
solid a writer as Thomas Mann was tormented by an ambivalence 
toward virtue . . . . 24 
Can we find parallels between contemporary literature and contem-
porary politics? Can the dwindling band of states which still provide the 
husbandly virtues of reliability, generosity, and respect for the interests 
of others be expected to continue in their increasingly thankless roles? 
May, paradoxically, these husbandly roles themselves become self-
mutilating?25 On the other hand, if all the states of the world were to 
24. S. SONTAG, AGAINST INTERPRETATION 52-53 (1969). 
25. Do we find an almost Thomas Mann like ambivalence in our own Supreme Court 
on "act of state"issues? In a Survey of International Law, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 105 (1973), 
I recently commented, at 130-31, on the Supreme Court's decision in First National City 
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), as follows: 
[Tlhe figure at the end of this paragraph graphically highlights the impasse in 
which the Supreme Court's decision leaves contemporary law and doctrine. 
(Ironically, while First National City Bank has the hallmarks of qualifying as 
the despair of international lawyers, it could bid for a pre-eminent position in 
the calendar of delights of analysts of the Supreme Court's voting patterns and 
of teachers of legal process.) That chart is as follows: 
ISSUES 
( 1) For order reversing Court of 
Appeals and remanding case 
(2) National City Bank v. Re-
public -0{ China should govern 
(3) Bernstein should govern 
(4) Act of State doctrine as 
enunciated in Sabbatino 
should govern 
(5) Sabbatino Amendment 
governs 
(6) Foreign expropriations char-
acterized as non-justiciable 
(7) Separation of powers and 
judicial independence invaded 
by Court'R opinion 
Von:s 
REHNQUIST DOUGLAS J. POWELL J . 
J .; 
BURGER C.J.; 
WHITE J. 
3 Yes 
3 Yes 
3 Yes 
3 No 
not mentioned; 
but possibly 
leaning towards 
Yes 
3 No 
3 No 
I Yes 1 Yes 
1 Yes 1 No 
1 No 1 No 
1 No 1 No 
I No I No 
1 No I No 
I Yes I No 
(dubitante) 
BRENNAN J .; 
STEWART J.; 
MARSHALL J. ; 
BLACKMUN J . 
4 No 
4 No 
4 No 
4 Yes 
4 No 
4 Yes 
4 Yes 
TOTALS 
5 Yes 
4 No 
5 No 
4 Yes 
6 No 
3 Yes 
5 No 
4 Yes 
6 No 
3 Possible 
Yes 
5 No 
4 Yes 
5 Yes 
4 No 
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play the parts of self-centered, obsessive lovers, who will be left to assure 
the continuity, stability, and the security of transactions so necessary 
to maintain contemporary levels of commercial activity and productiv-
ity which, in turn, are essential to the standards and expectations that 
are indispensable to the continued and peaceful development of the 
modern world? 
Can an apologist for this case demonstrate that the Supreme Court has pro-
duced any holding (apart from the exercise of its power in issuing the order of 
reversal and remand) on the problems which were raised for its judicial solution 
in the light of reason and authority? The legal profession would appear to have 
been left with more dilemmas than answers. 
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